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Abstract
,Two studies were run to determine whether the
interpretations of statements or forecasts using vague
probability and frequency expressions such as likely, i bbl
frequently, r Il, were sensitive to the base rates of the
events involved. In the first experiment, professional weather
forecasters judged situations drawn from a medical context. In
the second, students judged matched forecast scenarios of common
semantic content that differed only in prior probability (as
determined by an independent group of subjects). Results were:
(a) The interpretations of forecasts using neutral terms (e.g.,
Rossible) and terms above neutral (e.g., usually) were strong,
positive functions of base rate, while the interpretations of
forecasts using termsbelow neutral (e.g. rarIl) were much less
affected by base rates; (b) In the second experiment .
interpretations of forecasts appeared to represent some kind of




The question of whether the meanings of nonnumerical
expressions of uncertainty depend on context, and if so, how, is
important for related practical and theoretical reasons. The
practical Issues arise from the fact that most people, including
> ex~rt forecasters, generally prefer caxn.unicatin- thc;-
uncertain opinions with vague expressions such as doubtful,
probable, or unusual, rather than numerically. The theoretical
issues arise, of course, from an attempt to understand how
Judgment is formed, modified, and communicated on the basis of S
such expressions.
On anecdotal grounds, people prefer the imprecision of
nonnumerical phrases to the precision of numbers for at least two
reasons. First, their opinions or judgments are generally not
precise, and therefore it would be misleading to represent them
precisely. Second, people feel that they better understand the
meanings of words than of numbers, and therefore that their
opinions are better conveyed verbally than numerically. This
point has been made from a historical perspective by Zimmer
(1984), who noted that verbal expressions of uncertainty were
available long before the development of mathematical probability
concepts in the 17th century. Zimmer further suggested that
people process uncertainty in a verbal rather than a numerical
manner and that judgments are revised in light of new information .'
according to linguistic rather than numerical principles.
An Important requirement for the effective use of vague
expressions in communication is that their meanings be relatively
constant over contexts. However, if Zimmer is correct that
2
verbally stated uncertainties are processed linguistically, then
it is doubtful that this requirement is met, because the meanings
of words are frequently and systematically influenced by the
contexts in which they are embedded (e.g., Kess & Hoppe, 1981, 
0
-4 fha hih1innPranhy in Fries, 1980).
In many conversational situations, meaning is sensitive to
context, but communication does not suffer, because speaker and
listener share common assumptions and knowledge so that context -:
effects are identical for both of them (e.g., Searle, 1975, and
other essays in Cole & Morgan, 1975). However, it is
particularly in situations of uncertainty that communicating
parties are most likely to have different assumptions and
knowledge, and therefore for context to differentially affect
their understanding of words and expressions..ix.1J
It is worth mentioning at this point that there have been
recent suggestions within the context of fuzzy set theory that
.N k
the vague meanings of probability or frequency expressions (or of
linguistic variables more generally) can be represented by means
of membership functions over numerical bases (e.g., Hersh &
Caramazza, 1976; Zadeh, 1975). Representations of this sort
might be useful in formal decision or risk analyses because they
provide a mathematical means for handling forms of uncertainty
that are not well represented by probability theory (Watson,
Weiss, & Donnell, 1979). .
Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoportq Zwick, and Forsyth (1985)
provide a full discussion of membership functions, a method for
& tspivically deriving them, and a demonstration that such
functions can be established in a reliable and valid manner
3
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within a specific, well defined context. However, for this
approach to risk analysis to have any hope of success, it is
necessary that the membership functions for specific expressions
remain relatively fixed over individuals and over contexts. Even
wi thil the single context of the Wall sten et al . , -tly tihr. t 1-1 p
substantial individual differences in the membership functions
for a given expression. These results do not indicate, of
course, whether an individual's membership function for a
particular phrase changes systematically over contexts.
Related research suggests that context is important. A few
studies (Cohen, Dearnley, & Hansel, 1958; Borges & Sawyers, 1974)
have shown that the interpretations of quantifiers of amount,
such as some, several, many, and so on, are affected quantity of
the object available, or by properties of the objects involved
(Hbrmann, 1983). For example, both Borges and Sawyers and Cohen
et al. had subjects take a few, some, several, etc., marbles from
trays containing differing numbers of marbles. The more marbles
there were in the tray, the more that were taken in response to
any given request. Thus, the number corresponding to a
particular quantifier increased with the total number available.
Similarly, in a review of research on the quantification of
frequency expressions, Pepper (1981) concluded that such
expressions have a usual meaning as well as a range of meanings
that varies with person and context. In particular, the meanings
of at least some phrases vary as a function of the usual or
expected frequency of the event being described. Pepper's (1981)
conclusion rests in part on a study by Pepper and Prytulak (1974) 0
utilizing quantifiers of frequency such as freguentlZ or
4
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stometiMes. Subjects were asked the meanings of such phrases in
contexts of differing expected frequencies, or in the absence of
a context. In each case subjects indicated in how many out of OF
every 100 occasions a specified event occurred. The numerical
definition of each phrase was considerably less with a low
frequency context than for the others, and somewhat greater for
the high frequency than for the null context. These effects were
substantial. Thus, for example, the numerical value assigned to
very often in the context of earthquakes in California was less
than that assigned to sometimes in the context of gun play in
Hollywood Western movies. Considering the close corresporndence
between probability and frequency terms, one would predict that
the interpretation of probability terms is likely to be related
positively to base rates or to perceived prior probabilities.
From another perspective, one might consider the expression
of a probability phrase by an expert or knowledgeable person to
be diagnostic information. An individual 
might combine this 40
diagnostic information with his or her prior judgment about the
event to yield a revised judgment. However, it has been
demonstrated that under a variety of conditions people are
insensitive to base rates when processing diagnostic information
(Bar Hillel, 1983; see also Wallsten, 1983). Extrapolating from
this line of research, base rate should have little or no effect
on the interpretations of probability phrases.
Thus, the purposes of this paper are (a) to ask whether, and
if so, how, the meanings of proability expressions are influenced
by the base rates or expected probabilities of the events they
5
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modify, and (b) to replicate and extend the analogous work of •
Pepper and Prytulak (1974) with frequency expressions. Two
experiments are reported. Experiment I utilized professional
meteorologists as subjects, and demonstrated that even they, who S
use Probability terms regularly to convey levels of uncertainty
to the public, interpret such terms as a positive function of the
base rates of the events being predicted. Experiment 2 employed
college students as subjects within a more complete design to
explore more fully the parameters of the phenomenon.
Experiment 1 •
Meteorologists were asked to interpret verbal expressions of
uncertainty in medica contexts. Meteorologists were selected
as the subjects for two reasons. First, the clear communication
of uncertainty is important to them. They issue probabilistic ,.
forecasts on a regular basis, and they frequently do so with
nonnumerical probability phrases. Second, in the context of the "
probability of precipitation (POP), the National Weather Service
(NSW) has actually assigned certain probabilities to specific
phrases (National Weather Service 1984, Chapter C-II). If terms
that are given probability assignments and are used on a day to
day basis in one context are, nevertheless, influenced by base
rate considerations in another, then the importance and
pervasiveness of the effect is clearly established.
It Is Important to understand how verbal expressions are
0
used in POP forecasts. The one weather event for which numerical
probabilistic forecasts are provided to the U.S. public is that \.
of precipitation. In the case of precipitation, the National
Weather Service prescribes that the NWS forecaster must provide a
6,a
numerical pr jability POP judgment, and then may, at his or her
option also express this judgment nonnumerically. If the fore-
raster chooses to use a nonnumerical probability phrase, then a
probability of 0.10 or 0.20 must be translated as slioht chance,
0.30, 0.40, or 0.50 as chance, and 0.60 and 0.70 as likely.
utner prooaoiiity terms are not al I uv 11 '3p POP'v.S , b1%
they can be used in other ways. For example, possibly might be
used in a forecast such as "a chance of rain today, possibly .5
heavy at times.* Non-NWS forecasters (e.g., TV weather
forecasters) are not bound by these rules, but are generally S
aware of them.
Thus, an experiment was designed to answer two questions.
First, would the base rate frequencies of medical events affect
meteorologists' probability interpretations of the probabilistic
modifiers that they use regularly in weather forecasting?
Second, would meteorologists interpret probability phrases in a
medical situation according to values they have been instructed
to use or are aware of in precipitation forecasting?
A pilot study was run involving 20 NWS meteorologists. On
this basis a more complete study was undertaken with a larger
sample.
Method
Subjects. Questionnaires were sept to 60 meteorologists,
including NWS forecasters, television forecasters, and research
meteorologists, who were members of a local chapter of the Ameri- "'
can Meteorological Society. The cover letter promised that their I
responses would be discussed at a forthcoming meeting of their
group and indicated that the experimental results might be
7
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published.
Questionnaire and desion. A sample questionnaire is shown
in Table 1. Note that the first and third contexts, which can be N,
referred to as the coffee and ankle contexts, respectively, both 9
represent high probability events. tontje'A; 2 .-4 4- referring
to wart and flu situations, respectively, represent low probabi-
lity events. High and low probability contexts were selected A
informally following discussion with a medical consultant. Note
also the use of four probability phrases, likely, possible,
chance, and slight chance. These terms were selected because
they are commonly used in weather forecasts and because three of
the four terms have been assigned meanings by the NWS in the
context of POP forecasts.
The four basic contexts were combined with the four probabi-
litty phrases in two different 2 x 2 designs as shown in Table 2.
Half the meteorologists received the four context-probability
phrase combinations defined by the major diagonal of the first 2
x 2 design (likel,-coffee and Possible-wart), and the minor
diagonal of the second 2 x 2 design (chance-flu and slight
chance-ankle). The other half of the meteorologists received the
remaining four combinations. Thus, each meteorologist received
each scenario and each probability phrase once, but factorial .
designs were achieved that are necessary for suitable statistical
anal yses.
Subjects were instructed that they could respond with either
5* .;.
a single probability or a probability range. Responses were
returned by mail.
Table 1
Sample Questionnaire for Experiment 1 U
You normaiiy arink dbu"L 10-12 cups of strcng c-ff P Aay. The doctor
tells you that if you eliminate caffeine it is likely your gastric
disturbances will stop.
What is the probability that your gastric disturbances will
stop?_ _ _
You have a wart removed from your hand. The doctor tells you it is
possible it will grow back again within three months.
What is the probability it will grow back again within three
months?_ _
You severely twist your ankle in a game of soccer. The doctor tells S
you there is a slight chance it is badly sprained rather than broken,
but that the treatment and prognosis is the same in either case.
What is the probability it is sprained?
You are considering a flu shot to protect against Type A influenza.
The doctor tells you there is a chance of severe, life threatening .
side effects. "p





Forty-six responses were received, for a return rate of 77/.
Of the 184 probability estimates (46 subjects x 4
estimates/subject), 20% were given as the probability ranges and
the rest as single numbers. The range estimates were roughly
equally distributed among the four phrases. The subsequent
analyses utilized the point estimates plus the midpoints of the
probability intervals.
Figure I shows stem and leaf plots of the probability
estimates in each of the eight cells of the design. The
variability is considerable. Furthermore, although the response
distributions cover the NWS-assigned values for slight chance,
chance, and likely in all cases, in only three of the six
instances are these values at the modes (sliQht chance-ankle,
chance-ankle, and likely-wart).
Table 2 shows the mean estimate in each condition. It is
clear that on the average a given expression was interpreted as
reflecting a higher probability when it was used to predict the
high base rate than the low base rate event.
The impression from Table 2 is confirmed by statistical
analyses performed separately on the two matrices in the table. -
Within each matrix, one group of subjects responded in cells
(1,1) and (2,2), while the other group responded in cells (1,2)
and (2,1). Thus, the main effect of context was tested by first ,
assigning a score to each subject for each matrix equal to the
difference between his or her two responses in that matrix. A t-
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Experimental Design and Mean Responses for Experiment 1
Context






Slight change .23 .10
matrix tested the null hypothesis that I11- &22 = 12 - If
base rates positively affect probability estimates, then u -
"22 > 'A2 - 12 1 . The .t-tests were highly significant in both
cases, with t(44) = 3.17 and 5.99 for the top and bottom
matrices, respectively.
The phrase-context interaction was tested by first assigning
a score to each subject for each matrix equal to the sum of his
or her two responses in that matrix. A j-test comparing the two
groups of sum scores for each matrix tested the null hypothesis
that U 11522 - U12 + 21" The results were nonsignificant in
both cases, with t(44) - -0.27 and 1.56 for the top and bottom
matrices, respectively. Thus, in each matrix, the effect of




Two results are clear. First, in this medical context the
meteorologists were not particularly constrained in interpreting
the probabilistic phrases by the numerical conversion mandated by
ne i-i.o io- precipitation iorecasi-a. Tmu, , irib rwaiveiy
homogeneous group of subjects was no less variable in converting
probability terms to numbers than have been subjects employed in
other studies asking for numerical conversion of probability
phrases (Budescu & Wallsten, 1985). It should be noted that not
all the respondents were NWS forecasters. However, all were
interested in forecasting and generally aware of NWS policies.
Furthermore, similar results were obtained in the pilot study,
which was limited to NWS forecasters.
Second, and directly bearing on the goal of the present
work, the meteorologists' interpretations of probability
expressions in this medical context varied as a positive function
of event base rate. It must be emphasized that nothing in the
instructions nor in the questionnaire mentioned base rate or that
the various predicted events actually occur with differing
relative frequencies. Nevertheless, this variable had a profound
effect on the responses of this sophisticated group of subjects,
demonstrating the robustness of the phenomenon. W,
Experiment 2
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate under more
controlled circumstances the relation between perceived base
rates and the Interpretations of probability and frequency
expressions. Such information is necessary if we are to develop -1
13
a theoretical understanding of how judgment is formed, modified,
and communicated on the basis of verbal expressions of
uncertainty.
A pilot study was first run to develop sets of scenarios
with identical semantic content that differ only in perceived
base rate or probability. In the main study,the calibrated
scenarios were utilized in hypothetical predictions made by
experts. The expert's level of certainty in each prediction was




Subjects. Thirty undergraduates volunteered in partial
fulfillment of requirements for the introductory psychology
course. All were native speakers of English.
Materials. Fifty-six scenarios were devised, each with
three levels of a variable designed to induce low, intermediate,
or high probability judgments. For example, one of the scenarios
was, 'What is the probability of filling every seat in Carmichael
Auditorium for a ?I In this example the variable took on
high, intermediate, and low levels, respectively, of 'Tar Heel
basketball game, symphony concert," and 'circus. The
scenarios were of two types: person oriented, of which the
previous one is an example, or weather oriented, of which "What
is the probability of snowfall in Montreal in (September,
November, or March)?" is an example.
Three sets of materials were prepared, each consisting of
the 56 scenarios, each at one level. Each scenario appeared in
14
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each set at a different level. Assignment of scenario level to
set was random, such that each set had approximately equal
numbers of low, middle, and high variables.
V
Ten subjects were assigned to each set of materials. The
questions were printed sequenti ,;;. ,i, v .... .
random orders for each subject.
Procedure. Four to six subjects were run in a group, each
responding Independently in a booklet. Subjects were asked to
indicate how probable or likely they thought each specific event
S
was by giving decimal numbers ranging from zero to one inclusive.
Printed instructions said, "0 means that you think the event
would never happen, 0.5 means that you think the event is as
likely to happen as not to happen, and I means that you think the
event would certainly happen. Use intermediate numbers to
indicate intermediate probability judgments.'
Results
Our sole intention was to select scenarios with variable
levels such that mean probability estimates were significantly
different in the intended directions. There were an insufficient
number of scenarios for which the middle level dif+ered signifi-
cantly from both the lower and the higher for us to proceed with
all three levels. Thus, 36 scenarios were selected for which two
sets of responses differed in the anticipated direction by a t
score of at least 4. These are shown in the Appendix. The first
12 scenarios are weather oriented and the latter 24 are person
oriented. The modifiers under each scenario in the Appendix will
be discussed in conjunction with the main study.
15
The mean estimated probabilities of the high levels of the
scenarios range from 0.50 to 0.93, and those of the low levels
range from 0.22 to 0.76. The differences between the high and
low levels of a scenario range from 0.14 to 0.55, with a mean of S
0.30 and a standard deviation of 0.09.
Main StudY
The 36 scenarios were developed and scaled so that they
could be used in the main study as hypothetical predictions by
experts who express their uncertainty verbally rather than
numerically. By utilizing both levels of a given scenario with a
particular phrase (e.g., likely) and eliciting subjects'
interpretations of the expert's subjective probability in each
case, it is possible to assess the effect of prior probability,
or base rate, on the interpretation, while holding semantic
content fixed. A limitation with which we shall have to contend
is that the scaled probabilities do not go below 0.22.
The nine probability and nine frequency phrases employed in
the predictions are shown in the first columns of Table 3. Note
that four of each type are toward the higher end of the certainty
scale, one of each type is roughly neutral (possible and
sometimes), and four of each type are toward the lower end of the
scale. Because the meanings of such expressions are not precise •
(Wallsten, et al., 1985), subjects were asked what probability
the expert most likely had in mind, as well as lower and upper




Scenario and High/Low Effects within Expressions for Experiment 2
Scenario Effects High/Low Effects
.. .a Best high- Pilot high-
Epeso XILd r df Best low Pilot low
Probability
Sure .44* .106 .259
Likely .81** .187 .318
41.0** 8 >69.5** 8
Probable *74** .142 .297
Good chance .78** .223 .345
Possibie >18.4** 2 .71** 13.8** 2 .122 .311
Poor chance *55** .066 .312
Unlikely .42* .064 .259
34.9* 8 18.2* 8
Improbable .31 .028 .258
Doubtful .09 .078 .271
Frequency
Common .78** .163 .300
Usually .66** .116 .262
28.3** 8 >67.3** 8
Frequently .69** .144 .344
Often .79** .128 .306
Sometimes >18.4** 2 .65** >18.4** 2 .161 .308
Unusual .30 .038 .294
Seldom .19 .039 .276
32.3** 8 12.1 8
Rarely -.17 .014 .297
Uncommon .10 .048 .284
aee text footnote 1.





Subjects. Seventy-two undergraduate students responded to
notices around campus promising a $3 payment for participation in
a 30 to 45 minute computer controlled experiment on the meanings
of pr,'il it; expressions. All were nati , sroakors n
4 Fnnrli h.
Subjects were randomly assigned to 12 experimental groups, with 6
subjects per group.
Materials and design. Hypothetical expert predictions were
developed by combining each of the 36 scenarios in the Appendix
S
with six of the probability or frequency expressions shown in
Table 3. The expressions assigned to each scenario are shown
below each one in the Appendix. Expressions were not assigned
randomly to scenarios, but rather were selected subject to
certain constraints yielding 12 sets of predictions made by
experts. The number preceding each expression in the Appendix
refers to the prediction set number of which it was a part. %
One constraint was that extreme expressions not be paired
with events whose judged probabilities were extreme in the other
S
direction. Thus an attempt was made to keep all predictions well
within limits of believability.
A second constraint was that each of the 12 sets of
predictions employ 18 scenarios, while each scenario appear with
six expressions. Further, each of the 18 scenarios appeared in
a given prediction set at both its high and low level, yielding"".
a total of 36 distinct predictions in each set. Within each
prediction set both members of each scenario pair appeared with
the same probability or frequency expression. Thus, each
18 '
S '
expression appeared twice in each prediction setonce at each
level of a particular scenario. Expressions were assigned to
scenario pairs such that over the 12 prediction sets each
expression was utilized with both weather and person scenarios
and with scenarios that covered a wide range of perceived base
rates.
To summarize, the design can be conceptualized in either of
two ways, both of which were utilized for analysis. First, each
of the 36 scenarios was utilized at both its high and low level
with 6 expressions of uncertainty. Thus, within each scenario
there is a 6 x 2, expression x high/low level, design, with
repeated measures over the second factor. Alternatively, each
of the 18 expressions of uncertainty was employed with both the
high and low levels of 12 scenarios. Thus, within each
expression there is a 12 x 2, scenario by high/low level, design,
with repeated measures over the second factor. S
Subjects saw the predictions in the form of sentences.
Thus, for example, a prediction based on the first scenario in
the Appendix is, 'There is sure to be higher air pollution in
Louisville, Kentucky, than in Charlotte, North Carolina in
August.' All predictions for a scenario were written such that
the sentences were as similat as possible while maintaining good
English usage. . %
Procedure. The experiment was entirely computer controlled.
Subjects first read instructions on the screen. The instructions
informed them that they were to consider each sentence as it
appeared on the screen to be a prediction by a knowledgeable
expert about a particular event. Their task was first to
19
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indicate the probability the expert most likely had in mind when
making the prediction. This was to be followed by an indication
of the lowest probability and then the highest probability the fS
expert conceivably had in mind. Because of results of some
preliminary pilot work, the instructions emphasized that the
judgments were to be of experts' probabilities and not of the
strengths with which the expert held his or her opinions.
Following the instructions and then at any point throughout the
session, the subject was free to ask procedural questions of the
experimenter.
Each of the 12 subject groups received a different set of
predictions. Predictions were ordered randomly for each subject
with the constraint that one member of each of the 18 scenario
pairs appeared in the first half of the session and the other
member of each of the 18 pairs appeared in the second half.
The screen cleared for each trial. Then the prediction
appeared in the form of a sentence at the top of the screen.
Below the sentence was the question, "What probability does the _
expert most likely have in mind?* A line with an arrow centered
on it was drawn below the question. The line was anchored on the
left with a zero, on the right with a one, and there was an
unlabeled tick at the center of the line. The subject used left
and right arrows on the keyboard to move the arrow left and right
on the line. When the subject had located the arrow to his or
her satisfaction, indicating the expert's most likely probability
judgment, then the subject pressed the "Enter" key to register
that response. A marker appeared at the location of the arrow on
20
the line, and the question changed to, "What is the lowest
probability the expert conceivably had in mind?" The subject
could position the arrow any place from the left end of the line
to his or her previous judgment. Upon registering the lower
oouno oy pressing the 'Enter" key, a leii IMZ.L p,-av as L;,v
location of the lower probability, the arrow went back to the
position of the first response, and the question changed to,
*What is the highest probability the expert conceivably had in
mind?" Now the subject was free to locate the response at any
point from the right end of the line to the first judgment. Upon
registering that upper bound, the screen cleared and a new trial
was initiated.
Results
This section is organized as follows: We -first look within
scenarios to determine whether responses depended on the
probability or frequency expression and on the level of the
.1 %
high/low variable. Next are the analyses of major interest, all
of which are done within expressions. The first analysis is
concerned with whether probability estimates vary with the
high/low variable as predicted and with scenario. Subsequent
analyses explore the high/low effect and ask whether the scenario
effects can be traced to prior probabilities or to semantic
factors. Finally, we consider factors that may affect the
vagueness, or range of the estimates.
MANOVAs within scenarios. The first questions are whether
the present subjects agreed with the pilot subjects on the
relative probabilities of the two levels within scenarios, and
whether they attended to the various probability and frequency
21
expressions combined with each scenario to yield the predictions.
These questions are answered with the aid of a MANOVA on the
expression by high/low level, 6 x 2, design, for each of the 36 I
scenarios. The three dependent variables are the best
probability judgment, the lower bound and the upper bound.
Overall, the expression effect is highly significant. Over
the 36 scenarios, the multivariate F(15,174) ranges from 1.29 to
6.53 with a mean value of 3.41. This and all subsequent
multivariate Fs were calculated according to Wilk's criterion. S
For 31 of the F values, a ( 0.01, and for three more p < 0.05. 1'
From another perspective, the p values from M separate analyses .- ,
1% K
can be combined for an overall significance test by taking E - 2 0
In pi, where i = I,...,m. This yields a X2 statistic with 2r,.
degrees of freedom (Rosenthal, 1978). Combining p-values
separately over the 12 weather and the 24 person scenarios
results in X2 (24) ) 175.9 and X2 (48) > 362.6, respectively, for -'-
both of which p < 0.001. Thus, subjects were sensitive to the .
different probability or frequency expressions within scenarios.
The high/low effect is also significant overall, although it
is not as strong as that for expression. Over the 36 scenarios,
the multivariate F(3,63) ranges from 0.43 to 9.18 with a mean of
3.05. In 11 cases, I ( 0.01 and in 5 more p ( 0.05. Combining p .J.
values over the 12 weather and 24 person scenarios results in
X 2 24) = 69.8 and X2 (48) = 166.7, respectively, for both of which %
a < 0.001. The mean differences in the best probability
11n these and some subsequent cases, lower bounds are calculated
for the X 2 values, because the exact probabilities were not
available whenever a ( 0.0001
2%.
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estimates to the high and low levels of a scenario are in the
correct direction in all but two cases. The mean differences
range from -0.048 to 0.265, with a mean of 0.10 and a standard
-4 . A. The effect si7P ice similar for the judoed
lower and upper bounds.
ANOVAs within expressions. Having obtained the necessary
effects in the previous analyses, we now ask whether the ,
interpretations of predictions utilizing a particular probability
or frequency expression depended on the scenario and on the level
of the high/low variable. These questions are answered by
performing MAOVAs on the 12 x 2, scenario by high/low level,
design within each of the 18 expressions.
Overall, there is a significant effect of scenario. Over
the 18 expressions, the values of the multivariate F(33,380)
range from 1.11 to 2.89, with a mean of 1.76. In eight cases, p
( 0.01, and in six more, p < 0.05. Because the patterns of
results differ somewhat over the low, neutral, and high
probability and frequency expressions, it is prudent to aggregate
E-values separately within each of the distinct categories. The
resulting chi-square values with their associated degrees of
freedom are shown in the designated columns under Scenario
Effects in Table 3; all are sigwiificant at p < 0.01.
The effects of the high/low variable are less consistent
overall. The values of the multivariate E(3,129) range from 0.42
to 14.88, and differ systematically over type of expression. The
chi-squares and degrees of freedom corresponding to aggregated p-
values are shown in Table 3 in the indicated columns under
23
High/Low Effects. Note the highly significant effects for the
high and neutral expressions. The effects are much smaller for
the low expressions, and fail to reach significance in the low-
frequency case (unusual. . .uncgMnon).
el
Hioh/low effects within exoressions. The high/low effects
are a major focus of the study and require further exploration.
The magnitudes of high/low effects on the best probability
estimates are shown for each expression in Table 3 in the column,
Best high- Best low. The effect sizes are similar for the
estimated lower and upper bounds, indicating that when this
variable was operative, it shifted the entire range of meaning,
not just the best value within that range.
The pattern of significance levels indicated by the chi-
square statistics are reflected in the relative effect sizes.
Note that all effects are in the correct direction, but that
those for the positive and neutral expressions range from 0.106
to 0.223, while those for the low expressions are much smaller,
and range from 0.014 to 0.078.
The differences in mean pilot probability estimates between
the high and low levels of the 12 scenarios used with each
expression are shown in the last column of Table 3. They are
consistently greater than the effects on the best estimates in
this study. Within each expression the magnitudes of these two
effects were compared by means of a t-test for dependent
observations. The values of t(11) ranged from 2.79 to 8.14 for
which 9 < 0.01 in all cases. Similar results obtained for t- %
tests comparing the pilot effects to those for the lower and
upper bounds. Thus, the high/low variable has a less pronounced
24
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effect in the presence of the probability or frequency
expressions than in their absence.
Scenario effects within expressions. The significant
high/low effects must be due to differences in scenario
probability, because the semantic content is identical for each
high/low pair. However, the significant scenario effects may be
due in part to differing scenario probabilities and in part to
other factors. The role of scenario probabilities in the
scenario effects can be seen graphically in Figure 2. The 12
closed dots for each term plot the mean best probability •
estimates as a function of the scenario probabilities from the
pilot study for the high levels of the 12 scenarios used with
that term. The 12 open dots plot the mean best probability
estimates as a function of the scaled probabilities for the low
levels of the scenarios. Thus, each group of subjects
contributed two points to each scatter plot, one for the high and
one for the low level of a scenario. The correlations between
the mean best estimates and the scenario probabilities, ignoring
6
the high/low distinction, are shown in Table 3 in the column
labeled r under Scenario Effects. With the exception of six low
expressions, all the phrases have correlations of at least 0.44
that are significantly different from zero by the usual test. -
The significance test is not truly appropriate, however, because
each group contributed two points to the correlation, and
therefore pairs of points are not independent.
The significant scenario effects for the low expressions are
not accompanied by high correlations between the best and
scenario probabilities, suggesting that these effects are due to
26
other, perhaps semantic, factors. Of course, although scenario .0
probability clearly plays a role in the other scenario effects,
there is no reason to believe that it is the sole factor in those
instances.
It is of interest to fit linear functions to the scatter
plots in Figure 2. Because there is sampling error in both coor-
dinates of the points, and because our goal is to find the best
linear fit rather than simply to predict one set of values given
the other, the usual linear regression techniques are not suit-
able. Rather, the scatter plots were fit with linear structural
equations (Isaac, 1969), which simultaneously minimize the sum of
squared deviations over both axes. The slopes of these lines are
shown in Table 4 in the column labeled 2 Standard errors of the
slopes are shown in the adjacent column, and t statistics for the
hypotheses that p = 0 and I are shown in the next two columns.
Note first that the slopes for the high expressions as well
as for possible and poor chance are significantly different from
both zero and one. In these cases it is legitimate to conclude
that the effect of the phrase is to decrease high scenario proba-
bilities and to increase low scenario probabilities. The point
at which the function crosses the diagonal represents the
scenario probability that is unchanged by the verbal expression.
The diagonal intercepts are shown in Table 4. If it is thought
that the subjects' interpretations of the experts' predictions
represent some kind of an average between the prior probability
of the event and the meaning of the probabilistic modifier, then
the diagonal intercept can be taken as the best point
27
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interpretation of the meaning of the probability phrase, as
indicated in Table 4.
S
Table 4
Kesuit oi Linear Structural Fits to Scatter FIoLa in Figute 2
Standard t for t for Diagonal
Phrase 8 Error of 8 8 = 0 8 = 1 Intercept Mean
Sure .43 .43 2.82* 2.53* .8 8a .80
Likely .58 .15 32.80* 10.73* .72a .64
Probable .43 .19 13.98* 12.56* .6 6a .66
Good chance .67 .17 28.80* 4.87* .79a .67
Possible .60 .21 17.65* 5.02* .39a .53
Poor chance .40 .33 4.48* 4.94* .1 2a .30
Unlikely .21 .46 0.78 4.03* .24 .31a
Improbable .27 .66 0.58 1.71* .25 .33
Doubtful .25 .63 0.55 1.95* .28 
.36a
Common .51 .17 23.17* 12.19* .7 2a .68
Usually .47 .25 9.87* 6.78* .73a  .69
Frequently .57 .23 14.52* 5.09* .76a .65
Often .45 .16 20.98* 16.47* .65a .64
Sometimes .77 .25 15.11* 1.06 .05 .52
Unusual .20 .68 0.32 1.85* .28 .3 4a
Seldom .19 1.07 0.12 0.76 .30 .3 5a
Rarely -.20 1.20 0.10 0.59 .34 .29a
Uncommon .07 1.92 0.01 0.26 .33 . 3 5a
aBest interpretation
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The slopes for the remaining low probability expressions as
well as for unusual are significantly different from one, but not 9.
from zero, while those for seldom, rarel , and uncommon are
significantly different from neither one nor zero. It is notable
in the last three cases that the standard eror of the slope is
considerably larger than for any of the other expressions.
Inspection of the particular outlying scenarios that led to the
extreme standard errors provided us with no insight as to unique
meanings the phrases may have been assuming in those instances.
In any case, the expressions with slopes not significantly
different from zero are all the low ones, except poor chance, and
are those with the generally smallest high/low effects. It is as
if these phrases have relatively fixed interpretations that are
not influenced by the scenario probabilities. Their best point
interpretations are given by their mean values, as indicated in
Table 4. The conclusion that the expressions' interpretations
are fixed must be tempered by the fact that these phrases were
not used with prior probabilities below 0.20. Had such low pro-
babilities been employed, different conclusions may have emerged.
Finally, the slope for somelimes is significantly different
from zero, but not from one. Taken at face value, this result
suggests that sometimes has no independent meaning of its own,
but is interpreted entirely according to scenario probability.
However, the scatter plot for sometimes in Figure 2 suggests
otherwise. The anomalous statistical result probably occurred
because no scenario probability below 0.33 was used in this
instance.
As one test of whether the interpretations of the phrases
29
also depended on the semantic content of the predictions,
MANOVASs were run within each phrase to compare the responses to
the weather and the person oriented scenarios. Significant
effects due to scenario type were found for three of the 18
expressions (p ( 0.05), but this is well within the limits ot
chance. Therefore, overall, it cannot be concluded that there
was an effect due to scenario type.
Vagueness of the interpretations. A final set of analyses
looks at the range of the probability estimates, where range is
defined as the estimated upper bound minus the estimated lower
bound. The greater the range given by a subject to a
prediction, the more vague is that subject's interpretation of
the meaning of the prediction.
Within each expression, a scenario by high/low, 12 x 2,
ANOVA was performed on the range. As was done previously, the p-
values from the separate tests were aggregated within expression
type. The results are displayed in Table 5. The scenario effect
was significant in all cases, except for the neutral frequency
term, sometimes. The high/low variable had no effect on the
range.
Correlational analyses between range and scenario
probability and between range and best estimated probability do
not indicate any systematic relations. However, the magnitude of
the range is negatively related to the distance of the best
probability estimate from 0.5. Over the 18 expressions, this
correlation ranges from -0.03 to -0.66, with a mean value based
on r to L transformations of -0.36.
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Table 5 .
X2 Values for Scenario and High/Low Effects on Range in Experiment 2
df Scenario High/Low
Probability Expressions
High 8 29.0* 9.2
Neutral 2 10.2* 0.7
Low 8 25.8* 4.1
Frequency Expressions
High 8 20.1* 
11.7 0
Neutral 2 2.3 0.6
Low 8 21.1* 2.0
p < .01
In addition, the ranges for the different types of
6
expressions (high, positive and low) differed systematically.
The mean range for the neutral expressions is 0.30, that fop the
positive expressions is 0.25, and that for the low expressions is
0.23. In testing these differences statistically, it is
necessary to take into account the differential range effects due
to scenario. Recall that each scenario was utilized with six
expressions (c.f. the Appendix). All three expression types were
used with some scenarios and only two were used with other
scenarios. The mean range for each expression type was
calculated within each scenario. In each of the 8 scenarios
involving both low and neutral expressions, the range for the
neutral exceeds that for the low expression. Similarly, the
31
range for the neutral is greater than that for the high
expression in 12 of 18 scenarios. Finally, the high expression
range exceeds the low expression range on 18 of 26 occasions.
S
As a final test of the difference in ranges, t-tests for
S~~ e.rvations were calcu1pto 4Id r. Kai the ranges
within scenarios between neutral and high expressions and between
high and low expressions. Specifically, for each of the 18
scenarios utilizing both neutral and high expressions, a
difference score was calculated equal to 
the mean range for the ,w
neutral expressions minus the mean range for the high
expressions, and a t-statistic was calculated asking whether
the mean of these 18 difference scores deviated significantly
from 0. The result is t(17) = 2.92 (p ( 0.01). Similarly, the
t-test for the difference between high and low expressions yields
.(25) - 2.26 (p < 0.01). The conclusion is therefore firmly
established that the neutral expressions are most vague, followed
in order by the high and low expressions.
General Discussion
The two experiments taken together provide a strong
demonstration that the interpretation of nonnumerical probability
or frequency expressions generally depends on the base rate, or
prior probability, of the event being described. Experiment 1
indicates the pervasiveness of the phenomenon. Meteorologists,
for whom the communication of uncertainty is important,
interpreted verbal probability predictions in a medical context
in a manner that depended on the base rates of the events,
despite the fact that three of the four probabilistic expressions
had specified numerical meanings in their professional work. It
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must be added that the subjects knew when filling out the
questionnaire that their collective responses would be discussed
at a forthcoming meeting of their association. Therefore, it can
be assumed that they were motivated to provide their best
judgments. Clearly, if members of this group demonstrate a base
rate effect, then most other people will as well.
.NJ
Experiment 2 utilized college undergradutes in a more
standard experimental setting and yielded base rate effects of V
approximately the same magnitude as were obtained in Experiment
1. The results of Experiment 2 provide some insight into the
nature of the phenomenon. They suggest a theoretical explanation
and raise a question for which we do not currently have a good
answer.
Before focusing on these issues, it is important to discuss
our manipulation of base rates. In neither experiment was the
concept of base rates, or prior probabilities, mentioned to the
subjects, nor were the subjects' base rate judgments obtained.
This feature has two implications. First, in view of the
considerable individual differences in the judgments of
probabilities and the interpretation of probability phrases
(Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Wallsten et al., 1985), the exact
parameter estimates obtained in this study should not be taken
too seriously. Second, despite the subtlety of the base rate
manipulation, it was very effective. This fact must be
contrasted with the large number of studies showing people to be
relatively insensitive to base rates when making judgments on the
.5.
basis of diagnostic Information (Bar Hillel, 1983; Kahneman &
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Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). As Bar Hillel (1983) 9
correctly pointed out, the question is not, why do people ignore
base rates, but rather, under what conditions do they utilize
them? Based on a thorough literature review, she suggested that S
base rates are utilized when they are perceived as being causally
related to the event in question, when they are stated in a
specific manner, and when they are especially concrete or vivid.
None of the three conditions was met in the present study.
The present experiments differ from all the others on the
use of base rates, in that the others presented subjects with S
explicitly diagnostic information, whereas we gave them verbal
predictions from experts. These two types of information differ
in many ways, any of which might be important in determining the 9
weight given to base rate information. It must be emphasized
that subjects were not attending to base rates simply because
they found the experts' predictions useless, since judgments
depended on the latter as well.
Turning now to the present data, it is noteworthy that the
probability and frequency expressions yielded very parallel 6
results. In particular, there are two facts for which any theory
of the base rate phenomenon must account. The first is the
systematic differences in the nature of the high, neutral, and
low expressions. The neutral phrases are the most vague in their
meaning, while the low phrases are the most precise. Similarly, '\:
the interpretations of the high and neutral terms are strongly -
affected by base rate, whereas those of the low phrases are
affected very little and possibly not at all.
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It must be emphasized that the difference between the low
probability or frequency phrases and the others is not an
artifact. Wallsten et al. (1985) empirically established
individual subject membership functions for a variety of
;r t t ph'asc:r Although thcy d!d nct nz t
paper, it is the case that the functions for the high and neutral
phrases tend to indicate greater vagueness than do the functions
for the low phrases. In addition, differences across subjects in
the meanings of the expressions are less for the low than for the
high or neutral ones. Furthermore, Borges and Sawyers (1974),
Cohen et al. (1958), and Pepper and Prytulak (1974) all found that
the lower quantifiers were less sensitive to expected frequency
or to background quantity than were the other quantifiers. In
fact, Pepper and Prytulak (1974) expected such a result, writing
that 'in natural language, higher frequency expressions appear
more flexible in definition than lower frequency expressions" (p.
96).
The second result for which a theory must account is that
the phrases did not simply have an additive effect on the prior
or scenario probabilities. Rather, the high terms and possible
increased the Icwer scenario probabilities and decreased the
higher scenario p obabilities, with the points separating the
higher and lower probabilities (the diagonal intercepts in Figure
2) increasing from possible to sure or almost certain. Thus, the
meanings of the verbal expressions and the scenario probabilities
were being combined by the subjects in some sort of an averaging






result might have been apparent with sometimes if that expression
had been combined with lower scenario probabilities.) A.
One way to understand the present results is to assume that
a probability phrase has a relatively fixed, but vague core ..V,-
i ;ilng for an indi'idual, perhaps such as can be represenfer- h-
a membership function over the E0,13 interval. In addition, the
individual has a vague judgment of the probability of the event in
question, which, perhaps might also be represented as a function
over the E0,1] interval. Upon receiving a verbal probabilistic
prediction about the event, the person interprets that prediction
as a weighted average of two vague probabilities, that which he or
she associates with the expression, and that which he or she -o
associates with the event. The weight given to the scenario
probabilities might depend on how much independent information or
knowledge the individual has about the event in question,
although our data do not speak to that issue. Clearly, however,
low probability expressions are given more weight in the
averaging process than are neutral or high probability
expressions. As slight chance in Experiment I and poor chance in
Experiment 2 demonstrate, low expressions do not always dominate
the averaging process. The question for which we do not have a
good answer is why low expressions should be given so much weight
in general. Pepper and Prytulak (1974) suggest that high frequency
expressions are more flexible than are low frequency expressions,
and, therefore, of course, they would be given less weight. But
this explanation still begs the question as to why that should be
the case, which remains an important, unresolved issue to which
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High and Low Levels of Scenarios Plus Probability
and Frequency Expressions used in Experiment 2
1. There is higher air pollution in (Louisville, Pittsburgh) than in Charlotte
in August.
3-sure, 11-unlikely, 4-improbable, 2-frequently, 1-unusual, 12-seldom
2. At least (500, 20) people are killed by heat waves in the USA each year.
8-sure. Il-voor chance, 1-improbable, 12-often, 4-rarely, 9-uncommon
3. There is snow in Chapel Hill in (November, January).
9-likely, 10-unlikely, 8-improbable, 11-common, 12-rarely, 1-uncommon
4. There is a (1, 12) degree difference in temperature of city and country in spring.
10-likely, 7-improbable, 5-doubtful, 2-usually, 6-unusual, 9-seldom
5. There is snow fall in Montreal in (November, September).
12-probable, 5-improbable, 2-doubtful, 10-frequently, 3-seldom, 1-rarely
6. The temperature will hit (90, 110) degrees in Southern California in August.
2-sure, 11-probable, 7-possible, 12-usually, 10-often, 3-sometimes
7. Snow will accumulate at least (5, 12) inches during the winter in New York City.
4-sure, 3-likely, 2-possible, 7-usually, 6-often, 5-sometimes
8. The coastal waters of North Carolina are warm enough to swim in comfortably
during (August, May).
7-sure, 4-probable, 3-possible, 8-frequently, 5-often, 12-sometimes
9. There is snow in the North Carolina mountains during (December, October).
5-probable, 6-good chance, 9-possible, 4-common, 7-frequently, 2-sometimes
10. There is a layer of ice covering small lakes around Chapel Hill in (October,
January).
8-likely, 1-poor cbance, 4-unlikely, 6-frequently, 9-rarely, 5-uncommon
11. The first frost in Chapel Hill will occur by the end of (December, October).
1-probable, 12-good chance, 4-possible, 9-common, 8-usually, 11-sometimes
12. There is snow on the ground during the month of (January, October) in
Washington, D.C.
1-sure, 12-possible, 9-poor chance, 5-common, 2-unusual, 4-seldom
13. The average adult goes to sleep by (12 midnight, 10 p.m.).
11-likely, 8-poor chance, 9-improbable, 1-frequently, 6-rarely, 4-uncommon
14. The average American adult has (coffee, applejuice) with dinner.
7-good chance, 12-poor chance, 3-doubtful, 5-frequently, 10-seldom, 2-uncommon
15. The average worker lives within (15, 2) miles of his/her job.
12-sure, 2-poor chance, 11-doubtful, 3-often, 4-sometimes, 7-unusual
16. The average ferale will get married before the age of (29, 19).




17. A person will drop a non-required course after getting an (F, B) on the first
exam.
1-likely, 5-good chance, 4-poor chance, 9-frequently, 8-often, 12-unusual
18. A student who cheats on an exam will get caught if (15, 150) people are in class.
5-likely, 2-unlikely, 9-doubtful, 7-often, 10-rarely, 6-uncommon
19. Tim aver.6e &udeant will stay up past (12 midnight, 3 a.m.) durIng frnle ra ,.
6-sure, 5-poor chance, 3-unlikely, 1-common, 4-unusual, 8-uncommon
20. A student !4 ith a CPA of (3.8, 2.5) will continue on to graduate or professional
school.
7-likely, 10-poor chance, ll-improbable, 12-common, 3-unusual, 2-seldom
21. A student with a (1500, 1050) SAT will obtain a 4.0 average for at least 1 year.
8-probable, 6-possible, 9-unlikely, 1-often, 10-unusual, 11-rarely
22. A student with an (A, C) average in high school is on the Dean's list at least
once in college.
9-good chance, 7-unlikely, 10-doubtful, 8-sometimes, 11-unusual, 12-uncommon
23. Every seat in Carmichael Auditorium is filled for a (Tarheel basketball game,
circus).
11-sure, 12-likely, 4-good chance, 2-common, 9-usually, 1-sometimes
24. Calculus III will be failed after getting a (D, B) in Calculus I and II.
5-possible, 3-improbable, 1-doubtful, 12-frequently, 8-rarely, 10-uncommon
25. A student will be admitted to law school if he/she has a GPA of (3.0, 2.5) in
college.
4-likely, 1-unlikely, 2-improbable- 6-usually, 3-rarely, 11-uncommon
26. A student with an (A, C) average in high school will attend college.
10-sure, 8-good chance, 1-possible, 6-common, 5-usually, 9-often
27. Two students who have been roommates for (3 years, 2 weeks) will be roommates
next year.
10-good chance, 12-unlikely, 7-doubtful, 11-usually, 2-rarely, 3-uncommon
28. A paper due in (3 days, 3 weeks) will be started the day after the announcement.
11-possible, 7-poor chance, 6-unlikely, 4-frequently, 9-unusual, 8-seldom
29. A person knows the names of everyone who lives in his/her building of (5, 15)
apartments.
9-probable, 10-improbable, 8-doubtful, 7-common, 5-unusual, 6-seldom
30. Someone will order (french fries, onion rings) with a hamburger.
2-likely, 6-probable, 11-good chance, 1-usually, 3-frequently, 10-sometimes
31. An American will use British expressions after living in London (1 week, 1 year).
5-sure, 3-probable, 6-doubtful, 10-common, 8-unusual, 7-uncommon A..-'
32. A couple will have at least 1 child after being married for (5, 1) years.
10-probable, 5-unlikely, 12-doubtful, 3-usually, 2-often, 7-seldom
40
33. An American adult knows (how to drive a car, a foreign language).
7-probable, 2-good chance, 10-possible, 3-comon, 11-often, 6-sometimes
34. The average actor will not have an acting job for (3, 9) or more months a year.
9-sure, 8-unlikely, 12-improbable, 10-usually, 7-sometimes, 5-seldom
35. The average person will live in the same (state, house) all his/her life.
8-possible, 3-poor chance, 6-improbable, 4-often, I-seldom, 5-rarely
36. Someone will know the names of all his/her classmates in a class of (10, 30)
people.
3-good chance, 6-poor chance, 4-doubtful, 8-common, 11-seldom, 7-rarely
I
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